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Managing Federal Lands: Replacing the
Multiple Use System
The federal government manages almost a third of the surface
area of the nation1 under a management system which tends to favor
local users, particularly commercial interests. Recreation and con-
servation interests are underrepresented in the management process.
There are several reasons for this imbalance: Congress has given the
executive branch almost no statutory guidance for setting priorities,
and has delegated near total discretion in picking among alternative
land uses. Within the executive branch, the two agencies responsible
for administering most federal lands-the Forest Service and the Bureau
of Land Management--have shifted decisionmaking authority to the
local level, where local interests predominate. These agencies have been
exempted by Congress from many of the procedural requirements
which have traditionally insured some degree of formal involvement
by the general public in administrative decisions.
The present "multiple use" system should be replaced with one
incorporating a "limited use" concept, in which Congress would
determine single or dominant purposes for all federally-owned tracts
of land. New agencies could be established to administer land desig-
nated for each purpose, and could be subjected to the procedural re-
quirements normally applied to administrative agencies. These meas-
ures would be designed to insure representation of all interests--the
recreationist who lives in an eastern city as well as the logging com-
pany located near a western tract-and fulfill Congress' original
mandate that federal lands be managed in a way that "will best meet
the needs of the American people." 3
1. UNITED STATES PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW COMMISSiON. ONE TiIRD OF TE NATION'S
LAND 19 (1970) [hereinafter cited as PLLRC RETORT].
2. The Forest Service, within the Department of Agriculture administers twenty-fivc
percent of all federal lands. PLLRC REPORT at 22 (chart). The Bureau of Land Manage-
merit [hereinafter cited and referred to as the BLM]. an agency in the Department of
the Interior, has control of sixty-two percent of all federal holdings. Id. Much of the
land it controls is in Alaska. PLLRC REPORT at 327.
3. 16 U.S.C. § 531(a) (1970); 43 U.S.C. § 1415(b) (1970). The demands made by the
American people for use of federal land, particularly for timber and recreation purposes.
are growing rapidly. Forest Service figures show that in 1954 timber sales from the
national forests amounted to 5,474,000,000 board feet; in 1964 the figure was 11,141.000,.
000. M. CLAWsoN, THE FEDERAL LANDS siNcE 1956, App. Table 3 (1967). Sales were up
another fifteen percent by 1969. M. FRoME, TiE FoREsr SERvicE 85 (1971) [hereinafter
cited as FRO.M]. In 1954 there were 40,304,000 visits to Forest Service lands for recrea.
tion, and in 1964 there were 133,762,000. M. CLAwso., supra, at App. Table 4.
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I. The Multiple Use System
A. The Absence of Statutory Guidance
The land agencies are directed by statute to manage most federal
lands for "multiple use,"4 which in practice means that they have
nearly unlimited discretion in the allocation of land to particular
uses. The statutory definition of the term "multiple use" is a col-
lection of vacuous platitudes, providing authority for the "judicious
use" of land resources, "periodic adjustments in use to conform to
changing needs and conditions," and consideration of the "relative
value of the various resources" in case of conflict.5 The Forest Service
act lists five contemplated uses of National Forest lands: "outdoor
recreation, range, timber, watershed, and wildlife and fish purposes."
A special provision states that "the establishment and maintenance
of areas of wilderness are consistent with the purposes and provi-
sions" of the act.7 None of these possible uses, under either this
legislation or the similar BLM act,8 is given priority status. 9
Before passage of its multiple use statute in 1960,10 the Forest
Service only had authority to manage its lands for timber and water
resources." However, the expansion to "multiple" uses merely served
to legitimate what the Service had actually been doing for more
than thirty years.' 2 Between the wars, the Forest Service came to
4. Both the Forest Service and the BLM are to manage lands for "multiple use." 16
U.S.C. § 529 (1970); 43 U.S.C. § 1413 (1970). The Forest Service Act is permanent; the
BLM Act was only temporary and has already expired. See p. 789 infra,
5. The full definition from the Forest Service Act is as follows:
"Multiple use" means: The management of all the various renewable surface re-
sources of the national forests so that they are utilized in the combination that will
best meet the needs of the American people; making the most judicious use of the
land for some or all of these resources or related services over areas large enough
to provide sufficient latitude for periodic adjustments in use to conform to changing
needs and conditions; that some land will be used for less than all of the resources;
and harmonious and coordinated management of the various resources, each with
the other, without impairment of the productivity of the land, with consideration
being given to the relative values of the various resources, and not necessarily the
combination of uses that will give the greatest dollar return or the greatest unit
output.
16 U.S.C. § 531(a) (1970). The BLM version, referring to "lands" generally, is at 43 U.S.C.
§ 1415(b) (1970).
6. 16 U.S.C. § 528 (1970).
7. 16 U.S.C. § 529 (1970).
8. The BLM is afforded a few more contemplated purposes. 43 U.S.C. § 1411(a) (1970)
lists, in addition to the five Forest Service objectives and wilderness, the following: in-
dustrial development, minerals, occupancy, and "preservation of public values that would
be lost if the land passed from federal ownership."
9. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 1551, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1960); 43 C.F.R. § 1725.3.1
(1972).
10. Act of June 12, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-517, 74 Stat. 215, 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-31 (1970).
11. 16 U.S.C. § 475 (1970). This direction dates from 1897. Act of June 4, 1897, ch. 2,
§ 1, 30 Stat. 34.
12. Most of the Forest Service lands were set aside during the 1890's, under legislation
which permitted the President to close selected unclaimed western lands to homesteading
788
Vol. 82: 787, 197.3
Manaoing Federal Lands
recognize that various values and uses had to be accommodated with
the management of water and timber. It set aside large tracts of un-
developed land to be preserved as wilderness. 13 It developed roads
and campgrounds for automobile tourists. It allowed grazing on the
meadows and grasslands under its care, with a permit system later
copied by the Grazing Service and the BLM. It preserved wildlife
habitats, and leased land out for intensive recreational develop-
ment.'4 The multiple use statute in effect ratified these practices.
The BLM administers the remainder of the old vacant lands of
the American west.15 It was not given any comprehensive statutory
guidance for the management of its lands until 1964, when Congress
passed a multiple use act patterned after the Forest Service statute. 0
Although the BLM's act was temporary and was allowed to expire
without replacement in 1971,'i the Bureau continues to manage its
lands on a multiple use basis.' s
Until 1934, there was almost no active management of the BLM
and thereby assure that they would remain under federal control. Act of March 3, 1891,
ch. 561, § 24, 26 Stat. 1103, 16 U.S.C. § 471 (1970). These reserved lands came under
control of the Forest Service in 1905. Act of Feb. 1, 1905, ch. 228, § 1, 33 Stat. 628. 16
U.S.C. § 472 (1970). After 1911 the federal government purchased lands in the east and
added them to the National Forest system. This program was authorized by the Weeks
Act, Act of March 1, 1911, ch. 186, § 6, 36 Stat. 962, amended by Act of June 7, 1924,
ch. 348, § 6, 43 Stat. 654, codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. f§ 515-19 (1970). These eastern
lands are still treated differently from the reserved public domain lands, particularly
with regard to prospecting and mining privileges. See 16 U.S.C. § 482 (1970); 43 C.F.R.
§ 3811.1 (1972).
13. FRO.tE, supra note 3, at 94-96.
14. Hearings on H.R. 10572 Before a Subconn. of the House Comm. on Agriculture,
86th Cong., 2d Sess. 37-39 (1960).
15. The BLM is the successor of the General Land Office, whose task it w-as to oversee
the disposition of federal land to homesteaders, stockmen, and other private parties. M.
CLAWSON, THE BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEE NtmEr 28 (1970) [hereinafter cited as CLtvso.].
The Land Office, and the Grazing Service within it, were organized into the BLM in
1946. 1946 Reorg. Plan No. 3, § 403, eff. July 16, 1946, 60 Stat. 1100. See CLAIVSO. 38.
Land dispositions continued on a large scale through the 1930's. CtA.sox 16.17. By then.
the National Forest system had been removed from Land Office jurisdiction and the
better lands had passed into private hands. Today the BLM is left with little more than
semidesert, desert, and Alaskan tundra to manage. CLwso. 43.
Exceptions to this general rule are the blocks of woodland in the Pacific Northwest
known as the 0 & C and Coos Bay Wagon Road lands. A special set of statutory pro-
visions governs BLM management of these lands, barring homesteading and establishing
a special administrative fund. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1181a-81f (1970). Concerning the fund, see
note 69 infra.
16. Act of Sept. 19, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-607, 78 Stat. 986, 43 U.S.C. % 1411-18 (1970).
17. The Classification and Multiple Use Act of 1964, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1411-18 (1970), was
passed in companion legislation to that which created the Public Land Law Review
Commission, infra note 55. It was regarded as caretaking legislation to keep the BLM
going until the Commission could make its report. The Act was to expire six months
after the Commission's report was issued, 43 U.S.C. § 1418 (1970), and the report came
out in the summer of 1970. The Classification and Multiple Use Act duly expired in
January of 1971. The BLM now manages some of its land on the authority of the Ta)lor
Grazing Act. There is no single, comprehensive authority for management of the rest.
18. 43 C.F.R. § 1725.1 (1972). The administration introduced legislation which would
have provided permanent multiple use authority for the BLM, but it died in committee.
H.R. 10049, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
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lands, since they were all expected to pass into private hands. In
that year Congress passed the Taylor Grazing Act, designed to stabi-
lize the use of public domain by the stock raising industry. 10 Much
of the land now controlled by the BLM was organized into "graz-
ing districts" which were to be managed for their forage resources
2 0
The rest remained in limbo, nominally available for homesteading
but with few applicants for the privilege.2 ' This land remains under
federal control by default. For thirty years it has been clear that it
would not be homesteaded, but Congress provided no guidance as
to its management before the temporary act of 1964, and none
exists today.
B. Agency Land Allocation Decisions
Under current land agency procedures, the interests of those not
located near public lands are strongly disadvantaged in the process
of allocating land among competing users. Most other federal
administrative agencies provide for at least minimal public comment
during the rulemaking process and for the effective representation of
aggrieved parties in agency adjudications. The Forest Service and the
BLM, however, provide few opportunities for formal public involve-
ment in preparation of their land allocation plans, and they adjudicate
individual land use applications and appeals in a manner which
seriously hampers intervention by concerned recreation and conserva-
tion groups. At the same time, ample opportunity is provided for in-
formal pressure on agency planners and decisionmakers at the local
level, since present agency procedures give local officials critical de-
cisionmaking responsibility. Local users have the best opportunity to
exert such pressure; those located in other parts of the country, many
of them having strong recreational or conservationist concerns, are vir-
tually unrepresented. Among local users, commercial interests appear
to have an advantage over others, as a result of their financial and or-
ganizational strength.
19. Act of June 28, 1934, ch. 865, 48 Stat. 1269, 43 U.S.C. §§ 315-15g, 315h-15m, 315n,
315o-1 (1970). The act established a permit system for forage rights on certain public
domain lands designated by the agency. Grazing districts were to be administered by
a new Grazing Service within the General Land Office. This was the first statutory sug-
gestion that some Land Office lands merited active administration, at least "pending
. . final disposal" of the land. 43 U.S.C. § 515 (1970).
20. In 1968 there were almost 160 million acres in grazing districts. Hearings oil
Grazing Fees on Public Lands Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Interior and
Insular Affairs, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 131 (1969).
21. The absence of active management continued with respect to this land. For
example, until the 1950's no funds were available for recreational planning or develop.
ment. CLiWSON, supra note 15, at 23.
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1. Planning
The Forest Service traditionally, and the BLM increasingly, relies
on line officers at the district level to prepare plans for the use of
lands under their control.2 2 These district officers are subject to two
forms of internal agency supervision: planning guidelines and review
of completed plans.
General policy guidelines are issued by the Washington offices of
the agencies.2 3 Regional offices are expected to transmit these guide-
lines to district personnel, and to add technical advice provided by
specialists at the regional level. District officers thus receive a collec-
tion of plans prepared by specialists in particular fields, such as timber,
watershed, recreation, and range management.2 4 These different plans,
each emphasizing development of a particular resource on the same
piece of land, are often inconsistent. The district officer must recon-
cile them, and prepare a unitary plan for his district.2
Once a district officer has adopted a plan, he sends it back to the
regional office for approval and integration into a regional plan.2 (0 This
procedure, together with personal inspections by supervisors, is de-
signed to insure that no local officer exceeds his authority and that
officers have at least considered alternatives to the plan chosen. In both
agencies, the decision of the local officer is respected as the view of a
professional particularly well acquainted with the land under his super-
vision,27 and he is consequently given great latitude in planning.28
There is little opportunity for public involvement in reviewing or
challenging the decisions of district officers, or of any other officials,
in this process. Since matters "relating to ... public property" do not
22. These line officers, occupying the lowest levels in the management hierarchy of
each agency, are designated District Rangers by the Forest Service and District Officers
by the BLM. There are over 800 ranger districts in the Forest Service, FLatmE, supra
note 3, at 37, and sixty-three district officers in the BLM, CLAWso.N, supra note 15, at
56. The Forest Service Manual notes that the Ranger District organization carries out
all management functions with the assistance of staff experts from higher levels. US.
DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, U.S. FOREST SERVICE, MANUAL § 1221.71 (1968) [hereinafter cited
as FOREST SERVICE MANUAL]. See also Hall, Myth and Reality of Multiple Use Forestry,
3 NAT. RESOURCES J. 276, 284 (1963).
23. These are known as "directives" and make up a part of the loose.leaf Forest
Service and BLM Manuals.
24. In the BLM, the state-office-level specialists prepare tentative plans for manage-
ment of one particular resource. CLAWsoN, supra note 15, at 55. In current Forest Serice
practice teams of specialists from the Forest Supervisor's Office inspect a "planning unit"
and draw up a set of alternative plans, generally one which will emphasize each of the
major resources. See FoREsT SERVICE MANUAL § 2111.7 (1971).
25. CLAWSON, supra note 15, at 55; FoREsr SERVICE MANUAL § 2111.8 (1971).
26. See H. KAUFMAN, THE FoREsT RANGER: A STUDY IN ADINsynATVE BEJIAIOR 102
(1960); CLAwsON, supra note 15, at 59; FOREST SERvICE MANUAL § 2111.9 (1971).
27. H. KAUF.MAN, supra note 26, at 83-84; Cr.Awso., supra note 15, at 56.57.
28. Hall, supra note 22, at 284. See also Henning, Natural Resources Administration
and the Public Interest, 30 PUB. AD.MIN. REV. 134 (1970).
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fall within the rulemaking provisions of the Administrative Proce-
dure Act,20 land use plans do not have to be published in the Federal
Register for the purpose of eliciting public comment. While plans are
often submitted to advisory boards composed of interested users,3 0 these
boards have been set up by the agencies3x largely as public relations
tools, and could be abolished if they tried to interfere with the agen-
cies' work. They exist for the benefit of agency personnel, 2 who are
not required to consult the boards on any subject. 83
2. Adjudication
Land agency adjudications fail to serve as forums for the presenta-
tion of opposing user interests because of their limited scope and sum-
mary procedures. An adjudication is designed not to review the broad
policy decisions expressed in a land use plan, but rather to settle the
narrow question of whether a particular land use application is con-
sonant with the plan. The agencies hardly welcome conservation group
appeals with respect to grazing permits or timber contracts. By the
same token, the Sierra Club and similar organizations lack sufficient
personnel and money to intervene in all the local use applications
in order to argue for their conception of the public interest.
Even in those rare cases in which a particular commercial applica-
tion is deemed important enough to warrant legal opposition by recrea-
tion or conservation groups, land agency procedures present a formi-
dable barrier. Once again, the Administrative Procedure Act is largely
inapplicable, since no record is required and no hearing made manda-
29. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1970). Land plans would otherwise fall within the Act's definition
of "rule." Were the act applicable, proposed plans would by statute have to be pub-
lished in the Federal Register for public comment thirty days before adoption. This
exception to the Administrative Procedure Act has been much criticized but not yet
deleted. See generally Bonfield, Public Participation in Federal Rulemaking Relating to
Public Property, Loans, Grants, Benefits, or Contracts, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 540 (1970).
30. The Forest Service has set up a network of more than 166 advisory boards to
meet with regional, local and national officials and discuss policy matters. Heyman &
Twiss, Environmental Management of the Public Lands, 58 CALW. L. REV. 1361, 1409
n.176 (1971). The BLM has a similar network. PLLRC REPORT, supra note 1, at 288.
31. An exception is the network of Grazing District Boards, set up by statute in an
amendment to the Taylor Grazing Act in 1939. Act of July 14, 1939, ch. 270, 53 Stat.
1002, amending Act of June 28, 1934, ch. 865, 48 Stat. 1269, codified as amended at 43
U.S.C. § 315o-1 (1970). Each local grazing district has a board composed of one wildlife
expert and from five to twelve local ranchers. The intention of the framers of this
amendment was to provide the Grazing Service with the assistance of knowledgeable
local residents in drawing up the boundaries of the new districts and in allocating
permits to use them. In 1950 Congress established similar grazing boards for the Forest
Service. Act of Apr. 24, 1950, ch. 97, § 18, 64 Stat. 87, 16 U.S.C. § 580k (1970). Permit
zones and tenure have been stabilized for thirty years now, and the boards carry on
as formally established interest groups.
32. See, e.g., FoREsT SERVICE MANUAL § 1352.02 (1972). See also id. at § 1352.41 (1972)
(agency officer alone is empowered to call meetings and may terminate them at will).
33. See, e.g., FOREsT SERVICE MIANUAL § 1352.03 (1972).
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tory34 at early stages of the process. As a result, land agency adjudica-
tions are often summary.35
Judicial review of agency adjudication offers little hope for a party
or intervenor unsuccessful at the agency level. Under the broad dele-
gations of the multiple use acts, courts are hesitant to overrule land
agency decisions. A plaintiff challenging such a decision would have
to show abuse of discretion or a total failure to consider "the relative
values of the various resources" involved.30 No plaintiff has sustained
that burden to date.3
7
3. Commercial Pressure on Agency Decisionmakers
Users who are not directly involved in local land use applications
will thus have few opportunities to influence the allocation of fed-
eral lands through formal means of intervention. This situation might
be of little concern if land agency officials could be insulated from all
34. The provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act regulating adjudication apply
only when a record developed at a public hearing is necessary before decision is reached.
5 U.S.C. § 554 (1970). In the land management statutes, only the Taylor Act imposes
such a requirement. 43 U.S.C. § 315 (1970). Thus land use decisions outside of the cre-
ation of a grazing district need not be reviewed by an independent examiner, after
oral presentation of evidence and cross-examination, as the Administrative Procedure
Act would normally require.
35. Applications for particular land uses are generally written and submitted to a
deciding officer in both the BLM and the Forest Service. If an application to the Forest
Service is challenged the officer may at his discretion consider the written arguments
of the challenger. In BLM challenges, if one potential user is challenging the title or
interest of some other person in a tract of federal land, the proceeding is called a
"contest" and a hearing is granted. 43 C.F.R. § 4.450-1 (1972). In cases which do not
involve the titles or interests of two private parties, the adjudication is called a "protest"
and the agency may allow or refuse a hearing at its discretion. 43 C.F.R. § 4.450-2 (1972).
The initial decision may be appealed to intermediate levels of the agency hierarchy
and to Washington. 36 C.F.R. § 211.21 (1972); 43 C.F.R. § 4.410 (1972). The appeal is
made difficult by the fact that the ultimate decision may turn on issues not argued
below. McCarty, A View of the Decision Making Process Within the Department of the
Interior, 19 Ansin. L. REv. 147, 175-78 (1967). Appeals within the Forest Service are
made on the basis of the original papers and statements of the deciding officer and
the applicant. 36 C.F.R. § 211.21 (1972). Third parties such as conservation groups are
generally able to prosecute appeals, though they are not formally entitled to do so by
the agency regulations. In the Forest Service, anyone "adversely affected" may appeal
a decision if the decision is "appealable." The only decision which is not appealable is
rejection of a bid. 36 C.F.R. § 211.21(a) (1972). Review in the BLM is limited to "parties
to the case." 43 C.F.R. § 4A10 (1972). On the difficulty of intervening in a BLM ad-
judication, see Note, Conservation and the Public Lands: Administrative and Judicial
Remedies Relating to the Use and Disposition of the Public Lands Administered by
the Department of the Interior, 68 MICH. L. REV. 1200, 1213-18 (1970).
36. The Multiple Use Acts require such consideration. 16 U.S.C. § 531(a) (1970); 43
U.S.C. § 1415(b) (1970).
37. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Hardin, 325 F. Supp. 99, 122-23 (D. Alas. 1971) (suit to
enjoin performance of fifty-year contract between Forest Service and lumber company
for lumbering of the Tongass National Forest; Sierra Club had failed to exhaust admin-
istrative remedies, but lost on the merits as well); Dorothy Thomas Foundation Inc. v.
Hardin, 317 F. Supp. 1072, 1075 (W.D.N.C. 1970) (suit to enjoin cutting of National
Forest land contiguous to private summer camp; plaintiffs failed to produce "one scn-
tilla of evidence" of abuse of discretion which would justify preliminary injunction).
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user pressure, so that they could manage federal lands solely on the
basis of their expert judgment and close knowledge of their districts'
problems. However, even the most highly trained and well-intentioned
district officer is likely to be influenced, however subtly, by the local
users with whom he must constantly deal.
This influence takes three principal forms. First, the line officer's
friends and neighbors are the same local people who make demands
on the resources under his control. There is understandable social pres-
sure to conform to their wishes.38 Second, these same local users are
likely to sit on the advisory boards with which the line officer deals.89
Even without real authority, such boards can assume the role of or-
ganized lobbies for the common interests of their members. Finally,
the agency adjudication process is used heavily by local persons to
challenge decisions about the use of particular lands. The decisions of
agency officials at both the local and regional levels may reflect the
desire to placate such interests in order to minimize time-consuming
appeals. 40
Recreational users living far from federal lands cannot successfully
compete with these local users in exerting informal pressures at the
local level. Non-local commercial interests, in addition to recreation.
ists, may be disadvantaged in their competition with local commercial
users. Such commercial interests, however, are more likely to have the
financial and organizational strength necessary to represent their views
in the local decisionmaking process, and compensate at least partially
for their geographical separation. Non-local recreational users and con-
servationists may be almost totally unrepresented in the local process,
38. H. KAUFMAN, supra note 26, at 75-77.
39. See Heyman, Land Planning on Public Lands, 6 LAND & WATER L. REV. 387, 409
(1970).
40. Professor Kaufman makes the following observation about Forest Service ad-
judications:
Every Ranger and former Ranger interviewed in the course of this study has been
involved in appeals cases of some kind. It is accepted as one of the hardships of
doing public business in a democratic government and is not ordinarily treated as a
discredit, even if a field officer is eventually overruled. Yet it is a bother, at best-a
distraction from the more "productive" labors of the members of the Forest Service,
a cause of additional paperwork, a generator of inspections and inquiries from
higher levels. And it is certainly true that, at worst, a Ranger whose constituency Is
constantly restive and rebellious is likely to stimulate some doubts about his ju-
diciousness and skill. So Rangers prefer to avoid them if they can, and are con-
fronted with a delicate choice between the annoyance and risk of continuous skirmish-
ing with local interests on the one hand, and conceding away elements of the Forest
Service program (perhaps to save the remainder) on the other.
H. KAUFMAN, supra note 26, at 78-79.
As an indication of the kind of adjudicative pressure under which the agencies now
operate, the BLM reported that it had 120,082 adjudications open in 1971, and closed
74,882 of them. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, BuREAU OF LAND MANAGE-
MENT, PUBLIC LAND STATIsrIcs 1971, at 146.
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and they ordinarily lack the funds and personnel to appeal through the
agency's adjudicatory process.
Similarly, at the national level, commercial users have an advantage
over recreation advocates, for two reasons. First, persons and firms in-
terested in obtaining exploitation rights on public lands are much
fewer in number than the potential recreational users. This alone
makes the cost of organizing a collective pressure group much smaller
for the commercial interests than for recreationists. 41 Second, conserva-
tionists labor under the "free rider" problem; their members' incen-
tives are undercut by the fact that, even when they win favorable plan-
ning decisions, they do not gain exclusive use of the benefits of their
victory.4
2
II. Limited Use Alternatives
To the extent that the imbalance of influence is aggravated by the
ambiguity of multiple use directives, the solution might be for Con-
gress to enact statutes limiting the uses of particular tracts of federal
41. See M. OisoN, THE LOGIC OF CoLLrzcIvE AcToN 46-47 (1965). See also id. at 48,
discussing reasons why larger groups fail to achieve their common interests as effectively
as smaller groups.
42. A free rider is one who benefits from a public good without paying for it. See
J. BUCHANAN, THE DENAND AND SUPPLY OF PUBUC GOODS 87 (1968). The free rider prob-
lem makes it difficult for recreational and conservation groups to raise the funds neces-
sary to protect their interests.
That commercial lobbying is effective at the national level can be seen from two
recent controversies. In 1966, a joint study by the Forest Service and the BLM estab-
lished that grazing fees for that year should have been, by fair market value, $1.23 per
animal-unit-month (a figure roughly equivalent to the amount of fodder needed to feed
a mature cow for a month). The fee actually charged in the BLM was 330. Both agen-
cies adopted schemes to bring grazing fees up to market value over a ten year period.
Congress refused to prohibit these proposed increases, and a court challenge to them
failed. See Pankey Land & Cattle Co. v. Hardin, 427 F.2d 43, 45 (10th Cir. 1970). Despite
congressional acquiescence in the change, Interior Secretary Hickel decided that there
would be no fee increases on the BLM grazing lands. See Ctwswo, supra note 15, at
175-77.
In 1969, several congressmen supported a timber-lobby bill that would have increased
allowable cuts and returned some of the profits from timber sales into a special fund
to be used for construction of access roads to open up more timber for cutting. S. 1832,
91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). Aroused conservationists blocked passage of the bill. Within
a year, President Nixon ordered the Forest Service to increase allowable cuts and use
more federal funds to construct access roads. See FRo.tE, supra note 3, at 167-73.
Recent congressional hearings uncovered commercial abuse of public lands which is
at least partly the result of the imbalance of influence between developers and conser-
vationists. Hearings on Clear-Cutting Practices on National Timberlands Before a Sub-
comm. of the Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
Senator Gale McGee of Wyoming stated at the hearings that there would be little log-
ging in his state if the Forest Service did not permit destructive practices; he labelled
the Service the "nursemaid" of the timber industry. Id. at 7. The hearings also brought
out evidence of widespread overuse of National Forest grazing lands; almost four-fifths
of suitable grazing land under the Forest Service was in either "fair" or "poor" con-
dition in 1969. Id. at 297-301. The witness who gave this information blamed rancher
organizations, including advisory boards, for pressuring the agency into permitting such
overuse. Id.
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land. Such "limited use" management would entail the designation of
a particular favored use for each tract of land, and could take two dis-
tinct forms: other uses could be permitted to the extent that they did
not interfere with the favored use, or other uses could be barred from
the land altogether. These two alternatives will be referred to, re-
spectively, as "dominant" and "single" use management.
Limited use management would not be novel in and of itself. It is
already practiced, however imperfectly, in several of the smaller fed-
eral land agencies and management systems. Furthermore, a special
commission established by Congress to study current laws relating to
use of public lands has suggested that most of the land now under
the multiple use statutes be managed according to the dominant use
concept. The example of the smaller agencies and the proposals of the
commission, with appropriate revision, could provide a framework for
restructuring the system of federal land management to insure ade-
quate consideration of all competing interests in federal lands.
A. Existing Limited Use Systems
The two primary land management agencies, outside of the Forest
Service and the BLM, are the National Park Service 48 and the United
States Fish and Wildlife Service.44 Commercial exploitation is almost
entirely banned in the National Parks, and is permitted on refuges
administered by the Fish and Wildlife Service only when compatible
with wildlife protection.
The Park Service is authorized to manage park and monument land
in its natural state as "pleasuring-ground" for the people of the na-
tion.45 Each park is created by special legislation which defines the
uses to which the land may be put, and the Park Service is bound by
these special acts. While there are variations among park statutes, 40
all speak of preserving the land as parks for public enjoyment.
43. The Park Service was established in 1916. Its organizing statute is codified at 16
U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
44. The Fish and Wildlife Service was established by 16 U.S.C. § 742b(d)(2) (1970),
partly to oversee the wildlife refuges created by 16 U.S.C. § 668dd (1970). The Park
Service and the Fish and Wildlife Service together manage over fifty million acres of
land. In addition to the 49.9 million listed by the PLLRC, PLLRC REPORT, supra note
1, at 22 (chart), the Park Service manages several million acres of military cemeteries,
national seashores and recreation areas, and other small units. W. EVERnART, TIlE NATIONAL
PARK SERVICE 252-60 (1972).
45. The term is taken from Act of Mar. 1, 1872, ch. 24, § 1, 17 Stat. 32, 16 U.S.C. § 21
(1970), which established Yellowstone as the first National Park. Preservation of the
parks in their natural state is mandatory because they are to be kept "unimpaired for
the enjoyment of future generations." 16 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
46. For example, the statute organizing Mount McKinley National Park allows su-
pervised prospecting and mining in the park. 16 U.S.C. §§ 350-350a (1970). Mining Is
banned in the other parks. W. EvEmUART, supra note 44, at 49.
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Although national parks are devoted to the single "use" of recrea-
tionists, the agency must nonetheless reconcile the conflicting demands
of different interests within that group-car tourists and backpackers,
for example. Still, the most antagonistic potential user, the commercial
developer, has been excluded from the parks by statute.47 His lobby-
ing power cannot subvert the law's clear direction.
The Fish and Wildlife Service administers National Wildlife Ref-
uges, which were established to protect the habitat of native fish and
wildlife, particularly rare and endangered species.48 No use conflicting
with that aim is permitted on wildlife refuges.4 9 Commercial activity
is sanctioned only to the extent that it does not interfere with wildlife,
and visitors are strictly regulated."° As a result of this relatively clear
statutory direction, the wildlife policies of the Fish and Wildlife Service
are rarely threatened by commercial interests.
Overlapping all of the federal land agencies is the National Wilder-
ness Preservation System, established in 1964 after years of congres-
sional stalemate. 51 The wilderness system is currently the purest of
established single use systems, in that no development whatever is per-
mitted on designated lands. Areas placed in the wilderness system are
to be preserved, according to Congress' statutory command, "untram-
melled by man," retaining their "primeval character and influence
without permanent improvement or human habitation."
52
47. The Park Service is entitled to permit grazing in the National Parks, 16 U.S.C.
§ 1 (1970), but generally no longer does so. U.S. DEPAR'I %F-%-r OF TIE xrF.%Ion, NATIONAL
PARK SERVICE, COMIPILATION OF TE ADMINISTRATIVE POLICIES FOR THE NATIONAL PARMS AND
THE NATIONAL MONUMENTS OF SCIENTIFIC SIGNIFICANCE (NATURAL AREA CATEcoRY) 58 (rev.
ed. 1970). But see Shanks, Hansen Country, N.Y. Times, Nov. 27, 1972, at 35, col. 2.
describing the grazing privileges of Senator Clifford Hansen in Grand Teton National
Park.
The National Park Service administers many lands other than national parks, and
so cannot be considered a single use agency. It has been proposed that the agency be
split into two parts, one to manage the natural areas and the other the historic parks.
N.Y. Times, Sept. 17, 1972, at 1, col. 5.
48. 16 U.S.C. § 668dd (1970).
49. 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(d)(1) (1970).
50. Visitors to wildlife refuges may not harm or destroy animals or vegetation, 50
C.F.R. § 26.8 (1972), or make excessive noise, 50 C.F.R. § 26.20 (1972). The) must stay
on roads and paths administered for public use; they may not wander into the back.
country of the refuges unless they have a permit or are accompanied by agency per-
sonnel. 50 C.F.R. §§ 28.1(b), 28.3 (1972).
51. The Wilderness Act, first proposed in 1956, was not passed until 1954 and then
only in a reduced version. Some of the bills introduced in 1957 would have included
almost sixty million acres in the wilderness system. For examples of such bills, see, e.g.,
S.1176 and H.R. 500, 85th Cong., Ist Sess. (1957). As finally passed, the act included only
nine million acres with provision for adding more. H.RL REP. No. 1538, 88th Cong.,
2d Sess. 9-10 (1964). The legislation covering the establishment and expansion of the
wilderness system is codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-36 (1970). Wilderness lands are not
currently placed under the control of a separate agency; the agency with prior control
over newly designated wilderness continues to administer it, but in conformity with the
Wilderness Act.
52. 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c) (1970). Hence, no roads may be built, no campgrounds may
be developed, no timber may be cut, and no buildings may be constructed on designated
wilderness lands.
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Further transfers of public land into any of these systemsr8 would
protect some land from commercial pressures now threatening the
multiple use agencies. More importantly, these systems can serve as
models for narrowing the discretion of administrators by centralizing
the land allocation decision. 54
B. The Public Land Law Review Commission Recommendations
The final report of the Public Land Law Review Commission,6 is.
sued in July of 1970, criticized the multiple use statutes of the Forest
Service and BLM for failing "to specify or provide standards for de-
termining priorities of use or guidelines for resolving conflict."' 0 The
Commission's proposed solution was to authorize zoning of lands for
dominant use.57 Only if a particular tract of land had no clearly iden-
tifiable "highest" use would it remain unzoned and managed for
multiple uses. 58 The task of classifying lands for dominant use would
be carried out by the existing agencies rather than by Congress.50 Dis-
trict officers, in consultation with new statutorily-created advisory
53. Both the Wilderness and National Park Systems are still growing. Congress has
directed that the Park and Forest Services review certain of their lands to determlne
which should be added by Congress to the Wilderness System. 16 U.S.C. 1132(b)-(c)
(1970). The reviews are to be completed by 1974. To date Congress has added a little
over a million acres to the Wilderness System, all but 200,000 of them from Forest
Service primitive areas. These additions are effected by discrete acts of Congress, not
codified. Wilderness area legislation, through the 91st Congress, from which the above
figures were drawn, will be found in the following Acts: Act of Mar. 21, 1968, Pub.
L. No. 90-271, 82 Stat. 51; Act of May 24, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-318, 82 Stat. 131; Act
of Sept. 28, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-532, 82 Stat. 883 (includes 3700 acres of Department of
the Interior land); Act of Oct. 2, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-544, §§ 601-04, 82 Stat. 926; Act
of Oct. 2, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-548, 82 Stat. 936; Act of Aug. 18, 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-58,
83 Stat. 101; Act of Oct. 10, 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-82, 83 Stat. 131; Act of Oct. 23, 1970,
Pub. L. No. 91-504, 84 Stat. 1104 (includes about 190,000 acres of Department of In-
terior land).
In addition, Congress is free to consider wilderness area proposals which do not have
agency blessing. No such proposals were passed until the 92d Congress met; it enacted
two. Act of Aug. 20, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-395, 86 Stat. 578 (new area in Montana); Act
of Oct. 21, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-521, 86 Stat. 1026 (addition to existing area in Oregon).
Eight new national parks have been established in the last ten years. Six are listed
by W. EVERHART, supra note 44, at 252. Arches National Park was created by Act of Nov.
12, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-155, 85 Stat. 422, and Capitol Reef National Park by Act of
Dec. 18, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-207, 85 Stat. 739, after Everhart's work was published.
54. Wildlife refuges and national monuments may be -created by executive order
without an act of Congress. 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(c) (1970); 16 U.S.C. § 431 (1970). Each Is
administered under a dominant use system. 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(d)(1) (1970); 16 U.S.C.
§ 4504-2(a) and § 4504-2(b) (1970). Parks are created by act of Congress only and are
managed under a single use system. See p. 796 supra.
55. The Public Land Law Review Commission was established in 1964 to engage In
a comprehensive review of laws relating to public lands. 43 U.S.C. § 1412 (1970).
56. PLLRC REPORT, supra note 1, at 43.
57. Id. at 51.
58. Id. Note that since the land most attractive for timber cutting might also be the




Vol. 82: 787, 1973
Managing Federal Lands
boards,60 would determine the dominant use of a particular tract of
land.
Like the present multiple use system, the Commission's proposed sys-
tem would depend on the expertise of local land agency managers,
who would be subject to exactly the same pressures that beset current
agency planning. The advisory board system suggested by the Com-
mission would formalize rather than reduce the bias in favor of local
users, since the boards would be composed of local persons represent-
ing local interests0' and planners would be required to confer with
them at all stages of the planning process.02
III. Limited Use Administration of All Federal Lands
The major flaw in the Commission's proposed system-its suscepti-
bility to local pressure-would be cured if Congress allocated lands to
a single or dominant use. I
The limited use concept, combined with a shift of decisionmaking
power to a national public forum, would provide opportunities for
representation of all interests in the land allocation decision. Further,
once the dominant uses were fixed, there would be little to gain from
pressuring a local administrator, for he would be bound by congres-
sional directive.
In attempting to establish a limited use system on a national scale,
Congress would be faced with two tasks. It would have to revise the
directive legislation for management agencies, so that each would have
a clearly defined end to which to apply its expertise; and it would
have to give each agency appropriate land to manage. The former
task could be completed by Congress itself; for the latter, professional
assistance would be required.
A. Proposed Limited Use Agencies
Congress could replace all of the existing federal land management
agencies with three new ones, responsible respectively for recreation,
timber and grazing. The new recreation agency would assume authori-
60. Id. at 60.
61. The PLLRC states that the local advisory boards "will be comprised of people
in the region or locality for which the land use plans are being developed and will
represent all of the principal interests affected by the decision flowing from the planning
process." Id. at 60. Agency personnel recognize that advisory boards represent local more
than national interests. CLAwsoN, supra note 15, at 149-51; W. EvzLmt tr, supra note 44,
at 91.
62. PLLRC R'oRT, supra note 1, at 60.
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ty for the interests now served by the Park Service, the wildlife refuges,
and the wilderness system. The timber agency would have control of
all fertile woodlands under federal control except those placed in the
recreation system, and the grazing agency would have all range land
with the same exception. Hence, the timber and grazing agencies could
each concentrate on maximizing production of renewable resources.03
Recreational lands would be managed under a modified single use
system. Although both wilderness and recreation lands would be man-
aged by a single agency, they would be strictly segregated by statute.
Wildlife preservation would be given equal priority with the favored
use in each of these segregated systems. Commercial use would be
entirely barred from all of the agency's lands.
The timber and grazing agencies, however, would be administered
under dominant use guidelines, so that recreation or any other use
compatible with the priority commercial use would be permitted. This
asymmetrical treatment of commercial and recreational lands is justi-
fied for two reasons. First, while heavy commercial use is incompatible
with wilderness preservation and some recreational uses, other recrea-
tional uses are not necessarily incompatible with commercial use.
Therefore, although commercial users should be banned from lands in
the recreation system, there is no reason to bar recreationists completely
from commercial lands. Second, dominant use administration allows
some agency discretion, and would result in the same imbalance as
exists in the present system if applied to the new recreational system.
In setting up these new agencies, Congress could adopt an addi-
tional procedural reform: all three of the new agencies could be
made subject to the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act.04
Proposed land use plans could then be subjected to public comment
after publication in the Federal Register, and the review process could
provide a forum for discussion of agency plans within the narrowed
63. Commercial lands should continue to be administered on the principle of "sus-
tained yield" written into present legislation. 16 U.S.C. § 531(b) (1970) defines "sustained
yield" for the Forest Service as "the achievement and maintenance of a high.level an.
nual or regular periodic output of the various renewable resources of the national
forests without impairment of the productivity of the land." See also 43 U.S.C. § 1415(c)
(1970) for the similar BLM definition.
Commercial lands would not be managed for the environmental values of clean air
and pure water, but their managers should be required to respect the National Environ.
mental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1970). Section 102(2)(c) of the act, 42 U.S.C. 9
4332(2)(c) (1970), requires agency personnel to draw up evaluations of the environmental
impact of proposed actions.
All lands should be managed to protect water resources; there would be no need for
a special watershed agency.
64. 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq. (1970). See pp. 791-93 supra. See also PLLRC Rti'oRT,
supra note 1, at 252, for the commission's opinions on applicability of the Adminis
trative Procedure Act.
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authorizations. Adjudication procedures could also be reformed to
require that contested applications be based on a record developed
at public hearings. Administrative Procedure Act hearing guidelines
would then apply.65
B. Allocation of Lands
In allocating land tracts among alternative uses Congress would need
professional advice and expertise. It might be tempted to rely on
existing personnel. Present officials, however, have a penchant for
empire building, and are more likely to fight for expanded domains
than to fairly articulate and choose among the interests involved.,,
The officials of the new agency would probably not behave differently.
Thus, an alternative source of expertise, directly responsible to Con-
gress, should be found.
To obtain such expertise, Congress could establish a special com-
mission. Such a body could be assigned the task of proposing a land
allocation plan, dividing every tract of land presently under federal
control among the new agencies. The Commission's membership could
be mandated by statute, with representation for industry representa-
tives, conservationists, and some agency specialists. Its plan, however,
would be purely advisory. Congressional approval would be required,
along with the normal process of committee consideration, hearings,
debate, and recorded vote. Although the Commission would cease
to exist following presentation of the plan, 67 Congress might later
revise the allocations initially approved, in response to changing na-
tional needs.
65. These guidelines are set out in 5 U.S.C. §§ 556-57 (1970). They include an independ-
ent trial examiner and opportunity for cross-examination. See note 34 supra.
66. In the North Cascades Park controversy, for example, the Park Service seemed
quite content to take land away from the Forest Service, and the Forest Service corre-
spondingly loath to give it up. Only pressure from the cabinet level brought the agen-
cies to create a compromise plan. W. EvERmART, supra note 44, at 189-90. Also, both of
the agencies have been slow in review of backcountry areas for possible inclusion in the
Wilderness System. The Forest Service still had two and a third million acres of
primitive areas to review as of 1972. Hearings on S. 2453 and Related Wilderness Bills
Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 92d Cong., 2d
Sess. 89 (1972). In 1964 when reviews began there were five and a half million acres of
land in "primitive area" status. FROME, supra note 3, at 99. Thus, in the first eight
years of the ten year review program, the Forest Service completed slightly more than
half of its assigned task. Only 200,000 acres of Park and Refuge land have been added
to the Wilderness System, see note 53 supra, which suggests that the Department of the
Interior is even farther behind in reviewing its lands.
67. The Public Land Law Review Commission was established on such a format.
43 U.S.C. § 1415 (1970). However, membership was mainly from the congressional land
committees dominated by westerners. The allocation commission suggested here would
need a more balanced membership.
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C. Advantages of Such a System
Shifting land use decisions to the national level, and requiring a
single comprehensive review, would enable full representation of all
users and interests regardless of their location. At the national level,
anyone interested in a particular tract would be informed of the
government's proposed use for it; all users could exert influence on
Congress as the decisionmaking body. Land use determinations would
be reached only after consideration of their views. Commercial users
might continue to enjoy an advantage at this level, but conservation
and recreation interests would be better able to muster the financial
and organizational resources required to exert influence.
Shifting the responsibility for land use decisions from the execu-
tive branch to Congress would make the process more visible to the
public and more sensitive to individual voters' preferences. Special
interests may still lobby before Congress, but Congressmen are at
least required to record their votes formally, and justify them to con-
stituents every two years. The Commission, and the congressional com-
mittees considering its proposals, would be expected to hold public
hearings with opportunities to testify open to all interests. The execu-
tive agencies, by contrast, are far less directly responsible to an elec-
torate for their land use decisions. They answer to the President, who
runs for reelection only once, and whose campaign is such that per-
formance of his land use agencies is hardly likely to be raised to a
level comparable with other matters of domestic and foreign policy.
Thus, the national legislature, by virtue of its representative charac-
ter, is the proper forum for these decisions.0 8
This system of limited use management would have additional ad-
vantages. For example, it would facilitate planning for the responsible
development of the commercial resources of federal lands. Timber
lands could be operated as model tree farms, on the principle of sus-
tained yield.69 This principle is presently undercut by the knowledge
68. The defeat of Representative Aspinall in a primary election, the passage of the
New York environmental bond issue and the California Coastline referendum, and
defeat of the Colorado Olympics suggest that clearcut environmental issues attract voter
interest and" support. Conservation groups apparently are able to overcome commercial
interests' advantages through the electoral process.
69. For definition of sustained yield, see note 63 supra. The tree farm concept in.
plies some degree of reinvestment of profits in the production of new timber. Such
reinvestment has been practiced with great success by the BLM in managing its timber
holdings in Oregon and California. See Hearings on Problems in Lumber Pricing and
Production Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess. 614-15 (1969). Automatic reinvestment is provided by 43 U.S.C. § 1181f(c)
(1970). The Forest Service has areas which would return profits on investment, though
perhaps not as much as the 0 & C lands under the BLM. Lumber Pricing Hearings,
supra, at 602.
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that virgin lands may be opened to exploitation.-0 Once the available
sources of public timber were delineated, the cut-and-run mentality
could be restrained. Lumbermen, knowing that only an act of Con-
gress could open up more land to timber interests, would be more
receptive to limited cuts and crop rotation plans designed to con-
serve the timber resource. Similarly, ranchers would be more recep-
tive to conservative grazing practices if their rights and duties re-
garding public grazing land were clarified by statute.71
In general, planning for the use and preservation of recreational
areas would be more accessible to public scrutiny. Not only would
the Administrative Procedure Act require publication of proposed
land use plans, but the large size of the tracts allocated by Congress
would reduce the number of plans with which interested groups must
deal.72 Deviations from statutory guidelines and comments on the wis-
dom of proposed actions thus could be more easily brought to the at-
tention of administrators before recreation plans became final.
Resort to adjudication would be much less frequent under the new
system. The inefficiencies of using the cumbersome, case-by-case adjudi-
cative process for policymaking would disappear once policy was
established by Congress. Adjudication would become a process of test-
ing an administrator's actions against congressional directives, as it
ought to be. Since there would be manageable directives from Con-
gress greatly narrowing the range of discretion, appeals within the
agency and to the courts could provide meaningful control.
70. The lands that have opened up in the past twenty-five years have included a
good many marginal sites that should never have been logged. Clearcutting Hearings,
supra note 42, at 837, 839; Hearings on S. 1832 Before a Subconm. of the Senate Comm.
on Agriculture and Forestry, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 76 (1969). Sustained yield is impossible
on these sites. The prospect of new lands becoming available undermines the incentive
to use lands currently available cautiously in order to insure a future supply of lumber.
71. Although the Taylor Grazing Act curbed the worst abuses of the grazing privilege
on federal lands, there is still serious overuse of the forage resource. Part of the reason
for this is that public grazing fees are very low relative to the market value of the
grazing rights. See Grazing Fee Hearings, supra note 20, at 115-16 (1969). See also note
42 supra on the grazing fee controversy. There is an incentive for ranchers to overuse
the lands simply because use rights are inexpensive, and the ranchers can bring pressure
on local administrators to permit overuse. If market fees were required by statute, the
fees could be kept at market levels through the Administrative Procedure Act rule-
making process.
72. The Park Service, by agency practice and not by statutory command, holds
hearings on proposed master plans and changes in them. Since the hearings are held in
the vicinity of the park, public input at the hearing is probably biased in favor of
local interests. iv. EvERHART, supra note 44, at 91. There are, however, only thirty.eight
national parks, id. at 252 and see note 53 supra; some of them are relatively insignificant
units like Platt and Hot Springs National Parks, which encompass only 4500 acres be-
tween them. Id. at 252. Conservationists can keep much better track of the proposed
master plans than they can of the eight hundred or so unpublished ranger district plans
in the Forest Service, and can comment in writing after the hearings even if they can-
not attend them. This advantage would be carried over to the newv system if recreational
units were kept in large tracts.
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Finally, statutory allocation of land would reduce the substantial
time and energy now spent by users and managers in lobbying, adjudi-
cating, and commenting on plans.
D. Costs of a Limited Use System
If the present system allocates land to commercial uses which a
congressional allocation would shift to the recreation systems, the
national economy would lose the current production of some com-
mercially valuable lands. However, the lands could always be moved
back into one of the commercial systems in the future, so they would
retain a potential commercial value. Moreover, the present loss would
be moderated by two factors: first, the timber land allocated to recrea-
tion would most likely be the high altitude marginal lands which hold
natural stands of timber but are not suitable for tree farming; sec-
ond, with adequate funding both timber and range lands could be
managed more efficiently than they are now, and increased produc-
tion on intensely-managed lands could make up for the lost pro-
duction of designated recreation lands.
7
3
Mining would not fit neatly into a limited use system, since miner-
als are not renewable and cannot be managed. If mining were banned
on all recreational lands, as it should be in order to keep the lands
fit for park and wilderness use, there would undoubtedly be a loss of
resources available for current development.7 4 It might be possible
for the Geological Survey to prepare an inventory of mineral re-
sources on recreational lands7 5 which could be exploited with con-
gressional authorization in an emergency, but private prospecting and
mining would cease.
Closing some public lands to commercial users would undoubtedly
cause hardship to particular parties, primarily in the form of increased
transportation costs to loggers and ranchers. Over time, the addi-
tional cost of transport might force relocation of sawmills and perhaps
73. See note 65 supra on the effects of intensive management of BLM timber lands,
Earmarked funds for grazing improvements could provide similar increased returns and
charging market value fees should maintain earmarked funds at a high level.
74. Almost all federal land except the national park system is currently open to
mining. Lands subject to the General Mining Law of 1872, 30 U.S.C. §§ 22-38 (1970), may
pass in fee to the prospector who finds minerals on them; other lands and fuel reserves
are subject to a leasing system. See generally Edwards, The 1969 View of the 1872 Law:
Current Proposals to Modernize the General Mining Laws, 15 RocKY MTN. MINERAL L.
INST. 139 (1969) for an industry explanation of the mining laws and reform proposals.
Prospecting on Wilderness System lands will be banned after December 31, 1983, but
claims located before that date may be exploited. 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(3) (1970).
75. Such a survey is contemplated for wilderness areas. 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(2) (1970).
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might lower property values of ranches in given locations. 0 Considera-
tion should be given to government compensation for some of these
losses. 71
Insofar as flexibility enhances the efficiency of land use manage-
ment, there would be some economic loss merely as a result of the
inflexibility of the new system. But some decreased flexibility seems
an inevitable concomitant of the better representation of all interests
and improved planning possible through fixed land allocations.
IV. Conclusion
The present administrative structures of the Bureau of Land Man-
agement and the Forest Service do not respond adequately to the
full range of user interests. A system of limited use agencies adminis-
tering centrally-allocated lands could provide a framework for more
responsible management of both commercial and recreational lands.
Congressional allocation of land to various uses would result in better
representation of interests now disfavored, particularly those of recrea-
tionists geographically distant from the lands they wish to use. The
responsibility for reform rests with Congress.
76. Ranchers would suffer additional hardship if market value were charged for
grazing privileges, since many paid inflated prices for base ranches to-which low-cost
permits were traditionally given. See Grazing Fee Hearings, supra note 20, at 116-18,
141-42.
77. Held, Whose Public Lands?, 7 NAT. REsOURcES J. 153 (1967) suggests a public
policy of relocation and compensation when land is needed to satisfy national demands
for recreation and other amenities.
